This paper studies a job search model. Wage offers arrive in a Poisson fashion from a known distribution. Absent the option to quit, or in a stationary world, it is well-known that the reservation wage for an impatient worker is the flow return on the asset 'being unemployed'. I assume: (1) the worker may hold a job at his leisure, quitting at will; and (2) the wage distribution evolves deterministically. I show that the reservation wage is the flow return on the 'unemployment asset' with an option to renew at the same rate. I consider the effect of this renewal option, and investigate the continuity properties of the reservation wage.
Introduction
That one must search for the lowest price, best paying job, or optimal mate is both economically realistic and theoretically compelling. For instance, a standard continuous time formulation of the job search model goes like this. An unemployed worker awaits job offers, whose arrival process is Poisson. Jobs differ only by wage, whose distribution is known; employment precludes further search. The cost of search is an explicit flow payment (perhaps for a referral service) plus a pure time cost: The impatient worker prefers to earn money sooner rather than later. He then will accept any job paying weakly more than a reservation wage, equal to his expected value from further search. Think of unemployment as a financial security, affording the right to search further, and secure any wage found. In a stationary world, it is well-known that the reservation wage is the net flow return to this asset.
In this decision theory paper, I venture that the known wage distribution evolves deterministically. While this assumption is best seen as a stepping stone to a more general analysis, it aptly captures the temporary employment dynamics of Smith (1995) . In the standard steady-state theory, quits do not occur, for if a job is optimal to accept, it is optimal to retain forever. If the worker is indentured to his job, the above financial intuition obtains. Instead I assume that the worker may retain any position at his pleasure, quitting at will. Optimal exercise of this quit option adds a nice twist to the standard analysis. I consider the resulting link between the reservation wage and the unemployment value, underscoring that only a non-local relationship exists. I then observe that the worker's reservation wage becomes the flow return on the unemployment 'asset' with an option to renew at the same rate.
The problem can be more generally cast as an individual searching for manydimensional 'prizes', rather than jobs. While this does not enrich the above analysis, a continuity result is best understood in this setting. I show that the optimal acceptance set is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence of time. As a result, the reservation wage is necessarily an upper semi-continuous function of time. The paper concludes with a simple example of how some well-known comparative statics may fail in a nonstationary environment, and discuss some new ones that arise.
The model
Consider a continuous time setting, where an individual either has a job, or is searching for one while paying a flow search cost c. The income flow I at any time t is t thus either 2 c or some positive wage, generically denoted w. The word 'cost' is loosely applied here, since c $ 0 or c , 0 is possible: In a macroeconomic context, 2 c might well measure unemployment compensation. Even c 5 0 is permissible, in which case there is a pure time cost of search, owing to worker impatience: He discounts future payoffs at the interest rate r . 0.
Job arrivals follow a Poisson process with parameter r . 0. Thus, an offer arrives with chance about rdt in a small dt time span. The distribution of wage offers that are tendered deterministically evolves with time, with the c.d.f. process hF (w)ut, w $ 0j. For t each t, the distribution F has support on [0,`) with bounded finite mean; moreover, t t∞F (w) is a measurable function of time for every wage w. For instance, the wage t distribution may be fixed, or shift finitely or countably many times, or perhaps continuously with the passage of time.
For simplicity, the individual cannot search while working, and so cannot hold more than one job at a time. This reflects the opportunity cost inherent in accepting a job-a tradeoff at the heart of wage search models. Otherwise, the problem is trivial: The first positive wage is accepted, and thereafter any better-paying offer. (More generally, a tradeoff arises so long as there is a lower flow arrival rate of offers while working than searching.) Any job may be retained forever if desired, or freely dropped at will. Search costs are assumed low enough that one will never stop searching altogether, but not so low (and negative) as to render working unprofitable.
The individual chooses which wages to accept while searching, and ongoing jobs to quit, to maximize the expected present value of future wages less search costs borne. Since the costs and outside options of current and proposed jobs are identical, they must be treated symmetrically. Further, the deterministic evolution of kF l implies that an t optimal strategy is open loop (known at time 0) and not in feedback form: It cannot depend on the current wage or wage history, for instance. Thus, the individual accepts or retains any wage w belonging to an acceptance set ! at time t. A strategy is then a t measurable time-path of acceptance sets k! #R1ut$0l, which is a real correspondence t of time. Given this strategy, his supremum (average) value is theǹ
expecting over the income process kI l (wage arrival times and realizations). 
The main results

Optimal values
Recall the time-t (average) value of being unemployed V given in Eq. (1). Let V (w) t t be the employed (average) value with wage w in hand. Given the time-path kV l, it is
immediate that V (w)5max hw(12e 1e V j. Since one may always de-
cline an offer (choose T5t), the inequality V (w)$V is necessarily always true. To t t ensure a standard closed acceptance set, I proceed indirectly. Call a wage w at time t strictly agreeable if V (w).V ; this inequality obviously requires that the job optimally be t t retained for a positive time span T2t.0. A wage is agreeable iff w5lim w for a n→`n sequence of strictly agreeable wages w . The closed set ! of agreeable wage is then n t uniquely defined. The conclusion afforded by dynamic programming, specialized to the job search context, is that the value can be described recursively: Given the optimal reservation wage time-path ku l, we may then substitute out for the t employed value v (w). At the first moment after t that the threshold u equals or exceed t t w, namely T (w)5infhs.tuu $wj, the individual quits a job paying w. Since the value is t s scaled to the same units as the wage, this yields:
Lemma 1. There exists a unique continuous solution v of the Bellman equation t2
Recalling Lemma 1, observe that T (w)5arg max hw(1 2 e ) 1 e v j.
t T$t T
I now partially characterize optimal behavior, and compute ku l given kv l. There are t t many approaches to this problem. For instance, one could treat ku l as an infinite-horizon t 2 control, and use the calculus of variations. But a less ambitious route is much more 2 1 transparent. For ease of notation, define u (t);T (u ), namely the next time that the t t reservation wage will be at least as high as its current level. This is the moment that a maximizing individual will drop a job paying u . 
Proof. The inequality u #v follows from Eq. (3) and the identity v ;v (u ).
The result for u (t)5`is essentially that of Van Den Berg (1990 In words, when the reservation wage is rising, so that u (t)5t, its relationship to the unmatched value is purely local (and has a natural financial interpretation, as we shall see); when it is weakly monotonically decreasing on [t,`), then u 5v for all s$t, again s s a purely local relationship arises. But when it is falling, and later to rise higher, global optimality comes into play.
Some financial intuition`2 r(s 2t )
Define the spot market wage system kc l implicitly through v ;e re c ds. with an option to renew at the same rate. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that an individual taking a job does so knowing that she may remain in it for as long as she wishes at the same wage. That is, at time t , she is indifferent about exchanging the 0 variable return on the asset kv , t$t l for the flow return w5u that is fixed (for as long
as she wishes). If the option is never exercised, i.e. u (t)5t, then u 5c . Otherwise, the t t renewal option has value, and so u ,c . When it is forever exercised, in the case t t 21 u (t)5`, then the unemployed asset v is effectively sold, and so u 5v . If the renewal t t t option is not exercised at some future date, then no purely local relationship between u t and v can exist. 
A general continuity result
I temporarily abstract away from the model discussed above, in order to derive a somewhat more penetrating result. Treat the jobs as prizes x providing flow utility u(x) to the owner, where x is a vector of prize attributes. For instance, in the job search problem, there may be a multidimensional job characteristics space, with wage not the only consideration. Modify the job search model to suppose that the individual is constrained in the number of prizes she can simultaneously enjoy. Suppose that there is n given a Borel space of prizes x[R whose distribution follows a known deterministic evolution. As above, one either possesses a prize or must search for one.
I turn to a simple property of the optimal acceptance sets k! l over time. Fig. 1 . Optimal behavior given a foreseen wage distribution spike. The reservation wage (thicker lines) and unmatched value are depicted for a wage distribution that is known to be uniformly distributed at any moment in time (on the vertical slices) on the shaded region. Depending on the parameters r and b, either the solid or the dashed paths obtain.
Theorem 2 (Characteristic Space
uniform on (0, ae ), for some a.1 and g $0. This corresponds to a foreseen wage distribution 'spike' when g .0, and a foreseen one-shot upward shift in the wage distribution when g 50. Search costs are c$0.
Case 1 Analysis. t$t
Since the prospects are deteriorating over time after t, we have v 5u , and a job once t t accepted will never be dropped. Thus, Eqs. (2) and (3) reduce to
Since Theorem 1 asserts that u 5v for t [[t,`) , we have [0,a] at times [1,2)<[3,4)< . . . , then an optimizing individual will also employ a cyclical reservation wage rule. This will intuitively lead to a stochastic number of voluntary unemployment spells and eventual 'permanent' position with a sufficiently high wage.
Conclusion
This paper aims for a richer decision theory foundation for equilibrium search theory. There are two modelling assumptions worth commenting on, and defending. First, I have assumed that it is the outside environment, and not the job characteristics, that is variable. For if one's own wage were subject to change, then it might well be true that no current reservation wage rule alone could optimally serve as a quitting yardstick. In that case, or if one were slowly learning one's preferences about the job, then there might exist an index (e.g. Gittins index) that would serve the same role as the wage in this paper. Second, there is no distributional uncertainty here: I assume that the wage distribution evolves deterministically. It is not clear how to relax this assumption, nor even of any equally compelling way to formalize a nonstationary but uncertain environment. Still, a proper resolution of that complication will hopefully build on the simple insights of this paper.
